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Abstract
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spread and that these teams perform worse against the spread. It is possible that this e¤ect
is driven by the bookmakers setting a biased point spread or driven by excessive betting on
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"Billy, listen to me, white men cant jump."
Sydney Deane
1 Introduction
Some of the most deeply held ideas about race and racial di¤erence are expressed in our beliefs
about sports and athletic ability, creating one of the most well-known stereotypes: the natural
black athlete, and especially, the black basketball star. The common perception that black people
are better at basketball than people of other races and/or ethnicities is so evident that the term
"the black game" was coined to refer to the sport (see, for instance, George, 1992, and Freeman,
2010). What makes it so di¢ cult to counter the argument that blacks have an innate ability to
play basketball is that there appears to be evidence to support it: roughly 70% of National Basket-
ball Association (NBA) players are black. As a result, the idea that blacks are better basketball
players and the evidence that seemingly supports this idea can have far-reaching consequences af-
fecting observed behavior. For instance, a self-reinforcing loop may emerge where black youngsters
become encouraged by media images while the whites get discouraged to play the game, creating
a discrepancy in athletic participation (Hall, 2002; Ogden, 2004). For economists, a more in-
teresting question arises when these observations become unwavering, subconscious attitudes that
athletic ability is inextricably tied to race and these attitudes a¤ect economic decision making in a
predictable manner, thus challenging the rationality tenet in its standard form.
In this paper, we examine the relationship between NBA betting outcomes and the race of the
participants. Betting on NBA basketball generally involves a point spread wager, where the bet
wins based on the relationship between the nal score and the point spread. To illustrate, the Los
Angeles Lakers visited the Washington Wizards on February 3, 2008. The spread was +3.5 for
the home team, putting the Lakers as a road favorite and the Wizards as a home underdog. An
$11 bet on the Wizards would pay $21 if either the Wizards won the game or the Wizards lost by
3 points or less. An $11 bet on the Lakers would pay $21 only if the Lakers won by 4 points or
more. In this setting, the point spread is a market-based estimate of the actual margin at the end
of the game.1
This paper provides evidence that stereotypes have an impact on nancial decisions by examining
how the point spread and the performance against the spread in NBA betting markets varies with
the racial composition of the teams. We ask whether the belief that black players are better than
their white counterparts a¤ects the point spread and hence the likelihood of beating the spread.
1The Lakers won the game 103 to 91, and hence, beat the spread.
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In other words, do more black basketball teams look better than less black teams in the sense that,
all things equal, bettors are more inclined to bet on the former? If this is the case, then the spread
on a more blackteam will be higher than it should be, leading to a negative relationship between
the fraction of black players and the performance against the spread.
We examine the outcomes of NBA games and the Las Vegas point spreads on these games,
from the 1993-94 season through the 2007-08 season. We nd that the point spreads are higher
for teams with a relatively higher fraction of black players. We also nd that the probability of
beating the spread decreases as the fraction of black players increases. Note that our results are
robust to alternate measures of race: the di¤erence between the number of black players starting
the game, the number of black players on the full roster, and the minutes played by black players.
One important assumption in interpreting the nding that it is less likely for black teams to
beat the spread, concerns the e¢ ciency of NBA betting markets. In other words, it is implicitly
assumed that the spread incorporates all relevant and available information about the game. We
conrm that this is indeed the case, by showing that the actual margin minus the spread is normally
distributed with a mean of zero. Hence, unconditionally, any game has an equal probability of
ending up with a score on either side of the spread.
Further, the notion that the ability di¤erence is indeed a bias (or stereotype), and is not real, is
conrmed by the empirical observation that performance measures for black and white players are
not statistically di¤erent. In fact, white players tend to be taller and more e¢ cient in the sense
that they score almost the same points as black players despite playing fewer minutes. However,
there is no signicant di¤erence in terms of scoring ability between black players and their white
counterparts.
There are two hypotheses for the cause of the relationship between race and the point spread.
It could be that biased bettors place more money on the more black team, thus causing the spread
to move from an unbiased spread to a biased spread. Or it could be the case that the bookmakers
are aware of the bias of bettors, and set the spread in order to extract more surplus. Why would
bookmakers set a biased spread? Levitt (2004) shows that bookmakers can increase their earnings
if bettors have a bias. This is because the bookmakers can set the point spread in a manner such
that more than half of the money is bet on the outcome which wins less than half of the time. In
order to distinguish between these hypotheses, we use a second data set containing the opening and
closing lines, for the 2003-04 season through the 2009-10 season.
Our results show that the opening spread does not move at all a quarter of the time and the
di¤erence between the closing and opening lines is normally distributed around zero. Moreover,
the movement of the spread is not related to the racial composition of the teams in a statistically
signicant and robust manner. Hence, it appears to be the case that the bookmakers know of the
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bias towards more black teams and consider this when they set the spread.
To gain intuition on our results, consider two teams which are exactly as good as each other,
consequently each team will win with a probability of 0.5. However, one team is more blackthan
the other. Therefore, some people will have a bias that the black team is better and deem their
probability of winning to be greater than 0.5, even though the truthis 0.5. To exploit this bias,
rather than setting the spread as a pick-em(spread of 0), the bookmaker sets the spread in favor
of the black team at a value di¤erent than 0. This means that (all things equal) the black team
will cover the spread with a probability less than 0.5, making this a worse bet. This reasoning still
holds when the teams are not as good as each other. In this case, there is a true spreadwhich
each team will cover with probability 0.5. But the bookmakers do not set the spread at the true
spread but rather the true spread plus a few points for the black team. Again, the black team
covers with probability less than 0.5.
Let us return to the case where both teams are equally good, so the expected nal margin is
zero. Further, let us assume that the spread at which an even amount of money would be placed
both sides of the bet would be -3 for the more black team. In this case, since half of the money is
on either side of the bet, the bookmakersexpected payo¤ is determined exclusively by the betting
cost: for every $11 bet, the winner gets $21, that is, a return of $10 and not $11. Similarly if the
spread is set at 0, the bookmakersexpected payo¤ is again determined exclusively by the betting
cost.2 The prot-maximizing spread is somewhere between 0 and -3. So, the bookmakers set the
spread at, say, -2 and more money is bet on the black team because bettors think the spread should
be -3. Since more than half of the money is bet on the outcome which occurs less than half the
time, the bookmakers earn extra prots.
Our results imply that stereotypes can inuence behavior in nancial settings. Hence, we
contribute to the literature by providing evidence that economic decision making is altered by
conscious or subconscious categorization based on observable characteristics, e.g., race and gender.
Such biases appear more likely to stem from information-based motives than from taste-based
motives. Because the bookmakers seem to incorporate these biases into prices and there is no reason
to expect these particular agents to be of a di¤erent racial composition than the others. Also, if
one presumes that bettors from a particular city would be more inclined to bet on the team based
in their city and bettor racial prole resembles the demographics of the region, preference-based
explanations would imply a negative relationship between the black cities and the probability
of the more black home teams beating the odds. We do not, however, nd evidence of such a
relationship.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on sports betting
2For more on this, see Levitt (2004).
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markets and racial issues in sports. Section 3 provides an overview of the data. Section 4 presents
the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Background
Our paper relates to two strands of literature. The rst such strand examines the e¢ ciency of sports
betting markets. Sports betting markets provide an attractive test of market e¢ ciency because,
unlike most nancial markets, the sports betting markets contain well-dened prices, well-dened
outcomes and a nite time horizon. In particular, sports betting markets have outcomes which are
realized within a short time frame, are observable by all market participants, and are unambiguous
(no measurement error or uncertainty about the horizon over which outcomes should be measured).
Finally, these markets are unlikely to have uninformed traders due to the widespread availability of
information. Therefore, the questions related to the e¢ ciency of the sports betting markets are of
interest to economists in order to test market e¢ ciency hypotheses in general.
Echoing ndings in other nancial markets, several studies have found ine¢ ciencies in the sports
betting markets.3 For instance, studies have found that bettors erroneously place bets for sen-
timental reasons (Avery and Chevalier, 1999; Braun and Kvasnicka, 2008; Forrest and Simmons,
2008), on teams which are deemed hot (Brown and Sauer, 1993; Camerer, 1989), and on teams
which are favorites (Golec and Tamarkin, 1991; Grey and Grey, 1997). Levitt (2004) nds, using
data on the wagers placed by bettors as part of a handicapping contest o¤ered at an online sports
book during the 2001-02 NFL season, that the amount of money placed on both sides of the bet
is not equal and this imbalance is related to observable information. In particular, Levitt nds
that the proportion of money bet is higher for favorites and road teams. Levitt argues that the
bookmakers set the spread in order to exploit common biases: people like favorites and people do
not su¢ ciently account for the home eld advantage.4 Paul and Weinbach (2010) conrm this
nding using the percentage of bets actually placed on NFL games. Our analysis shows that the
bets on NBA games are also distorted by racial stereotypes.
The second strand of related literature involves the e¤ect of race on outcomes in sports. Again,
this literature is signicant beyond the sports context because it involves decisions which exhibit
large incentives for success or accuracy and the outcomes can be objectively measured. Price and
Wolfers (2010) nd a negative relationship between the personal fouls assessed against NBA players
and the number of own-race referees who o¢ ciated the game. Relatedly, Parsons, Sulaeman,
Yates and Hamermesh (2011) nd that the likelihood of a called strike in baseball is related to the
3See Sauer (1998) for an overview.
4Also see Kuypers (2000). Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) discuss the evidence that, in the odds betting of horse
racing, bettors have a bias towards betting on longshots rather than on favorites.
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agreement of the pitchers and umpires race. Although these judgments are made by well-trained
and experienced professionals, they are also made under great duress and must be made almost
instantaneously. Therefore, it is possible that these judgments, while obviously of great signicance,
would be attenuated if they were made under di¤erent circumstances. By contrast, the judgments
which comprise the data which we provide are made by individuals who have the opportunity to
reect on the merits of their decisions. Hence, our ndings imply that racial stereotypes may a¤ect
decisions even when they are made under an extended period of deliberation.5
There is also a literature involving an experimental investigation of the e¤ects of stereotypes on
judgments in sports.6 For instance, Stone, Perry and Darley (1997) directed subjects to listen to
an audio clip of a basketball game after viewing a picture of the player whom they were instructed
to judge. The subjects who were shown a picture of a black player rated the performance as better
than those subjects who were shown picture of a white player. While existing experiments are
suggestive of biases in judgments involving race and athletic performance, since the accuracy of
these judgments are not related to the material incentives of the subjects, it can be di¢ cult to
interpret these results. However, our study is not vulnerable to this critique because obviously
betting on the outcome of a basketball game is indeed related to a persons material incentives.
It should be noted that our paper does not deal with discrimination per se. Actually, the
phenomenon we study is a product of "positive stereotypes" and can perhaps be more accurately
viewed as "reverse discrimination" since the group which is deemed to be superior faces odds that
are harder to overcome. In other words, the belief that black basketball players are better creates
a bias for betting on the more black team and, as it becomes harder for the black team to beat the
spread.7 Still, one could think of this phenomenon in terms of the main theories of discrimination in
the microeconomics literature. In the rst of these theories, di¤erential behavior towards a certain
group of individuals is driven by the preference for not interacting with them (Becker, 1957; Arrow,
1973). In other words, individuals have a "taste" for their own kind or distaste for the other kind.
In the second theory, agents take race to be a signal for unobserved or costly information about
skill levels and mistaken beliefs can survive if they create self-fullling outcomes (Phelps, 1972).
In our context, information-based explanations would be more relevant if bets reected the prior
belief that blacks are better at basketball while the ndings would t the taste-based explanations
if white bettors bet against more black teams.8
5Kahn (2006) does not nd evidence of racial discrimination for NBA coaches. Price, Lefgren, and Tappen (2009)
do not nd evidence of a relationship between the success of a pass in the NBA and the race of the participants.
6For more on the stereotype of the athletic black man, see Biernat and Manis (1994), Sailes (1996), and Stone
et. al. (1999).
7Cheryan and Bodenhausen (2000) provide evidence that stereotypes can lead to such a "choking e¤ect" by
looking at the performance of Asian-American women in math tests.
8Unfortunately, we do not have information on the race of the individual bettors but we use the demographic
characteristics of the city that hosts the team to indirectly address this issue.
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To the best of our knowledge, the only other paper which addresses the intersection of race and
ine¢ ciencies in sports betting is Larsen, Price, and Wolfers (2008). They nd that the relationship
between race and fouls, documented in Price and Wolfers (2010), is signicant enough so that, given
information about the race of the referees and the relative racial composition of the teams, one could
improve their chances of placing a winning bet against the spread. By contrast, we focus primarily
on the racial composition of the teams. In addition, we analyze the opening and closing lines and
we nd evidence that the bookmakers are aware of the bias, thus suggesting that the phenomenon
is more likely to be driven by information-based motivations than by taste-based explanations. In
other words, we provide evidence that the bettors may be taking the racial composition of the
teams as a signal to guide their betting decisions. However, the evidence also supports the claim
that the bookmakers incorporate all relevant information which may not be reected in the racial
discrepancy between the teams and set the spread so that they can exploit the information-based
bias of the bettors. Finally, note that, as does Larsen, Price, and Wolfers (2008), we o¤er an
analysis of a simple betting strategy. The simple betting strategy proposed by Larsen, Price, and
Wolfers (2008) involves the interaction of the di¤erences in the race of the teams and the referees,
and in our case it is exclusively a function of the racial composition of the teams. Hence, arguably,
our strategy requires less information and is less computation-intensive than theirs. Our betting
strategies prove to be at least as protable, and often more so, than the ones analyzed in Larsen,
Price, and Wolfers (2008). Despite the di¤erences between Larsen, Price, and Wolfers (2008) and
the present paper, we view our work as o¤ering a complementary investigation into the relationship
between race and sports betting.
3 Data
Our baseline dataset combines box score information on all regular season NBA games played
from the 1993-94 season to the 2007-08 season. We exclude the playo¤ games since the outcomes
for these games tend to be path-dependent not only across games in the same series but also
through rounds, thus accentuating the survivorship bias in the sense that the number of player or
team observations would closely depend on their past performance. The box score information
is obtained at the player-game level from www.basketball-reference.com, which also keeps track
of draft picks and other background information of the players, such as the height and weight.
The ultimate team-game level dataset is constructed based on these player-by-player observations,
obtained from www.basketball-reference.com.
One crucial variable, however, for our analysis that is missing from the www.basketball-reference.com
website is the race of the players. In some cases (mostly for players that are still active), a picture of
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the player accompanies the statistics but this happens only at a small fraction of the overall player
universe during our sample period. Hence, we conduct an extensive search to obtain information on
the race of the players, navigating www.nba.com, www.hoopedia.nba.com, www.draftreview.com,
and Google images search. This information enables us, by visual inspection, to characterize the
racial composition of each team at a point in time. Admittedly, we use a rather coarse denition of
race by assigning players (and coaches) into two broad categories of black and white, where white
includes Caucasians, Asians, and Latinos. Yet, we use several measures to ensure robustness of
the results to a variable as subjective as a players race and also double-check our classication of
racial composition against other studies. For instance, the discrepancy between the race variable
used in Price and Wolfers (2010) and that used in our analysis exists for a mere 31 out of 1128
matched players. This di¤erence corresponds to only 2.5 percent of more than quarter of a million
player-game observations used in our dataset.
The data for the betting lines we obtained from www.goldsheet.com. We verify the accuracy of
the betting lines from this source against other sources commonly-used in the academic studies of
sports betting, such as www.covers.com, and nd no signicant discrepancies. In fact, information
on the ultimate outcomes of the games tends to be more accurate in www.goldsheet.com than it is
in www.covers.com: of the 41 cases when a discrepancy between the two sources exists, the cross-
check with www.espn.com conrms that the former has the correct information 80 percent of the
time. We complement this information on point spreads and closing lines with information on the
opening lines and the percent of bets placed on each side of the bet.9
A total of 18,450 regular-season games were played during the sample period. After excluding
the games where there is missing box score or racial composition data, we are left with 17,211
games. Further, after excluding the games where there was no betting information and where the
betting outcome was a push leading to cancellation of all bets (which happens around 1.3 percent of
the time), we are left with 16,402 games in the sample. Before we move on to the formal analysis,
we present some descriptive statistics of this nal dataset.
Of the 1021 players who were active in the NBA during our sample period, 71.8 percent are
black. Black players are even more over-represented in the starting line-up of the teams: only one
out of ve starters is white. In a typical game, each team employs 9 to 11 players, 8 of which are,
on average, black players. As a result, at the player-game level, 76.7 percent of the observations are
identied as being associated with a black player. These statistics conrm the casual observations
on the dominance of black players in the NBA, not only by sheer number but also by the visibility
they get by playing more minutes in more games.
Tables 1a and 1b provide a summary of the data used in our analysis at the player-game level,
9These data are available, at a fee, from www.sportsbetting.com.
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and Table 2 summarized the data at the team-game level. At the player-game level, there are some
statistically signicant di¤erences between black and white players. However, it is not always the
case that black players have "more desirable qualities" and the magnitudes of these di¤erences are
not very meaningful. For instance, while black players score roughly two points more than their
white counterparts on average, they are not as e¢ cient as demonstrated by their slightly lower eld
goal percentages. These statistics are not altered drastically when the raw statistics are adjusted
for playing time (Table 1b). According to these metrics, black players overall do not appear to
be much better than their white peers. If one assumes that the team is a sum or reection of the
skill levels of individual players, there seems to be no obvious statistical reason to deem more black
teams to be of better quality.
At the team-game level, on which we conduct the empirical analysis, we summarize the informa-
tion on betting spreads and the racial composition of the teams. Racial composition is measured
by three alternative metrics: the number of black starters, the number of black players on the team
roster regardless of whether they actually play in a game, and the minutes played by black players.
This nal metric is calculated as the average of the past ve games the team has played and is
expressed as a percentage of the total minutes in the game. To avoid duplication, all variables are
expressed from the home teams perspective. Simple statistics point to a slight advantage for the
home team as they win the game 60 percent of the time by an average margin of around 4 points
and beat the spread 55 percent of the time by an average of 2 points. However, note that the home
team is the favorite 70 percent of the time. A home favorite wins the game 72 percent of the time
while a home underdog wins only 34 percent of the time. Point spreads seem to take this into
account at least partially: a home favorite beats the spread 59 percent of the time and a home
underdog beats it 48 percent of the time. Note that the partial o¤set of the home court advantage
is in line with earlier studies showing a similar bias in NFL betting markets (Levitt, 2004).
4 Analysis
4.1 Accuracy of point spreads and the link between race and winning
probability
In order to demonstrate the relationship between performance against the spread and the racial
makeup of the teams, we estimate the following regression:
P (home team beats the spread)it = + blackit + Xh + 'Ys + (Xh  Ys) + "it
9
where the the dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes on the value 1 if the home team
beats the spread on game i played at date t and 0 otherwise, blackit is the di¤erence between
the "blackness" of the home team and the visiting team, Xh and Ys are (home) team and season
(during which date t is included) xed e¤ects, respectively. As noted in the previous section, the
blackness of a team is measured by the various metrics (number of black starters, number of black
players in the team roster, and the portion of minutes played by black players in the previous ve
games).
Thus, our empirical approach rests on a baseline specication where the probability that the
home team beats the spread is a function of the racial composition of the team relative to its
opponent. This relies on two assumptions and, before moving on to the analysis, we conrm that
these assumptions hold. Specically, it is assumed that the basketball betting markets are e¢ cient
and that the likelihood of winning a game does not increase in the blackness of the team.
The rst assumption is that basketball betting markets are, in general, e¢ cient, in that any
observable information should be reected in the spread. So, we start our analysis by looking at
the accuracy of point spreads in forecasting the game outcome. Figure 1 shows the distribution
of "forecast errors," dened as the actual margin (or realized spread) minus the point spread on
a game. Indeed, the errors closely resemble a normal distribution with zero mean.10 Figure 2
formally veries this statement by plotting the quintiles of the forecast error against the quintiles
from a normal distribution.11 We nd that our betting markets are, in general, e¢ cient in the
sense that the distribution of the di¤erence between the winning margin and the point spread is
not distinguishable from a normal distribution. In line with this, when plotted against the realized
winning margins, one can see that the point spread is a pretty accurate forecast of the actual game
outcomes (Figure 3).
The second assumption is that the probability of winning a game does not increase in blackness.
Table 3 presents the results of a regression analysis where the more black team in a match-up
is shown not to have a systematically higher probability of winning a game. The sign on the
variables of interest, i.e., blackness of the home team relative to the visiting team, varies from one
specication to the next and is not always signicant when the dependent variable is the realized
margin on the game (upper panel in Table 3). Therefore, there is little evidence of a positive
association between the blackness of the teams and the decisiveness of the nal scores. A quick
glance at the table would suggest a somewhat robust negative relationship between the blackness
of the teams and the probability of winning (lower panel in Table 3). It should be noted that
10See Wolfers (2006b) who examines the distribution of errors in college basketball games and nds evidence of
point shaving in games with a large point spread.
11Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions test as well as skewness and kurtosis test for normality further
verify that forecast errors are normally distributed. Results of these tests are available from the authors upon
request.
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this is not necessarily a sign of lower quality or generally worse performance of teams composed of
more black players against teams with more white players. Rather, in these baseline specications,
the relative blackness of a team may be capturing the e¤ect of other factors which determine the
performance of one team against another. Indeed, once factors such as the record of the team up
to a specic game in a season is controlled for, the magnitude and signicance of this coe¢ cient is
weakened.12 In summary, our assumption that the probability of winning a game does not increase
with the di¤erences in racial composition towards blackness has support in the data.
With the two assumptions veried, we now proceed to the regression analysis of the point spread
and actual game outcomes.
4.2 Race and point spreads
Table 4 presents the main ndings of our analysis. Here the analysis suggests that a more black
team tends to face a higher spread, and that the team exhibits worse performance against the
spread. Note that in each regression, team xed e¤ects and season xed e¤ects are employed. In
addition, we also control for the team-season interactions. Hence, neither the time-invarying team
characteristics nor the team-invarying time e¤ects are driving the results.
In the upper panel, the dependent variable is the spread faced by the home team. According
to our three measures of the racial di¤erences between the teams, we see that there is a positive
relationship between the spread and these measures. In the middle panel, the dependent variable
is the realized margin of the home team minus the spread. According to our three measures of
the racial di¤erences between the teams, we see that there is a negative relationship between the
blackness of the team and the realized margin minus spread. In the lower panel, the dependent
variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the home team beats the spread and zero otherwise.
Again, according to our three measures of the racial di¤erences between the teams, we nd a
negative relationship between the blackness of the team and the probability that they cover the
spread. To summarize, we nd evidence that a more black team tends to face a larger point spread
and that these teams perform worse against the spread. The evidence so far supports part of the
conjecture we introduced at the beginning: point spreads, even as they control for all relevant and
available information on the two teams facing each other, are disproportionately higher for more
black teams, consistent with the belief that they are better than those with more white players.
12These results are not presented here for sake of brevity but are available from the authors upon request.
11
4.3 Biased bettors or biased bookmakers?
A natural question then is, what is driving the relationship between the racial composition of the
teams and the performance against the spread. There are two competing hypotheses. The rst
hypothesis is that the bookmakers are aware of the racial bias of bettors and they set the spread in
such a way to exploit the bias à la Levitt (2004). The second hypothesis is that the bookmakers
are unaware of the bias of bettors and set the spread to be the expected nal score of the game
and the relationship found above is caused by bettors who systematically bet on the more black
team, thus moving the spread. In order to distinguish between these hypotheses, we investigate
whether there is a relationship between the movement of the spread and the racial composition of
the teams. Figure 4 demonstrates that the movement of the spread is normally distributed with a
mean of zero.
Table 5a presents the results of our regressions involving the movement of the spread. In our
rst specication, in which we do not account for team- and season-specic factors, or team-season
interaction terms, we nd a signicant relationship between race and the movement of the spread.
However, for the three specications in which we do account for these xed e¤ects, we do not nd
a signicant relationship between the race of the teams and movement of the spread. Moreover,
from Table 4, we know that there is a systemic relationship between the relative racial composition
of the teams and the spread itself. Hence, the spread reects the belief that teams with more black
players should be placed as favorites. To further this argument, we investigate whether the money
bet on the home team is related to the relative racial composition of the teams in a statistically
signicant way. Table 5b shows the results of this exercise. There appears to be a positive, albeit
statistically weak, relationship between how much more black the team is and the percent of bets
in favor of the home team beating the spread. Put di¤erently, the spread is set in a way that the
resulting bets are skewed in favor of the more black team. As a result of the regressions in Tables
5a and 5b, we favor the explanation that bookmakers are aware of the bias of bettors and set the
spread to exploit this bias.
4.4 Robustness checks
How robust are our results? We perform several robustness checks controlling for the race of the
referees, the race of the coaches, and the racial composition of the location of the home team.
First, one concern is that our results no longer hold when one accounts for the racial composition
of the referee crew. For instance, Larsen, Price, and Wolfers (2008) nd that the racial composition
of the referee crew, together with the racial composition of the teams, is relevant and can make an
impact on the probability of a team winning the game and, hence, beating the spread. Specically,
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the authors nd that teams can become disadvantaged when the racial composition of the referee
crew di¤ers from the racial composition of the team. We perform a series of regressions with the
dependent variable as the probability of beating the spread, however, we restrict attention to the
following categories: an all-white crew, a crew with at least one black referee, a crew with at least
one white referee, and an all-black crew. We also consider the case where the crew is neither
all black nor all white. Finally, we add the proportion of white referees as an additional control
variable in our baseline specication. Table 6a presents the results of these regressions. Even when
accounting for the racial composition of the referee crew, our results remain signicant in each case
with the exception of an all-black crew. However, note that an all-black crew is an extremely rare
occurrence as it accounts for only 152 games out of 16,186 in our sample. Hence, in the majority
of the games in our sample, it remains true that it is harder for the more black team to beat the
spread.
Second, another important factor could be the race of the coaches. One could imagine that
when the home team has more black players and, according to the beliefs, is more talented, there
can be an additional bias if bettors also think that a more black team led by a black head coach
should do even better than they would when led by a white head coach. We follow a similar
approach as when controlling for the racial composition of referees and split our sample by the
di¤erence in the race of the head coaches of the two teams. Again, we also run a regression where
the di¤erence between race of the home teams head coach and that of the visiting teams head
coach is introduced as an additional control variable. Results of these regressions are presented
in Table 6b. Interestingly, more black home teams actually have a better chance of beating the
spread when their head coach is white but the visiting team is led by a black head coach. We
also note that when the coaches are of the same race, a majority of the cases, we nd the negative
relationship between the blackness of the team and the probability of beating the spread. Finally,
our nding from the baseline regression also holds when the di¤erence between the head coaches is
controlled for as an additional regressor in the specication.
It is also possible that the biases found above are related to the racial composition of the bettor
or the racial composition of the location of the basketball team. While we cannot account for
the race of the bettors, we can control for the racial composition of the location of the teams.
Therefore, to the extent that a person living in the location of the team is more likely to bet on
the team, we can test whether our results are driven by the characteristics of the populations of
the location of the teams. We run a series of probits with probability of beating the spread as the
dependent variable. We include the di¤erence in black starters as an independent variable, while
accounting for the racial composition of the location of the teams. In particular we account for the
di¤erence in the proportion of blacks in the city and di¤erence in the proportion of blacks in the
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state. In Table 6c we present the results of these regressions. In all specications, the di¤erence
in black starters remains signicant, and none of the terms accounting for the racial composition
of the location are signicant. As a result, we do not nd evidence that the racial composition of
the locations are related to the bias found above.
On a related question about the race of the audience and the team, Kanazawa and Funk (2001)
nd that the television ratings of games are positively related to the fraction of white players on the
teams. This is seemingly at odds with the evidence that white teams are perceived to be worse at
basketball. Presumably spectators attend basketball games or watch on television in order to see
"good basketball." If this was the case, there would be a negative relationship between the white
composition of the teams and television ratings for that game. Yet, this nding could be explained
if one considers another factor: that the majority of NBA fans are white (or that white fans are
more likely to create revenue). Hence, while these white fans think that black players are better
they still prefer to watch the white players, leading to a "premium" for white players. This is in
line with the own-race preference, which would predict that white audiences choose to watch white
players as they derive utility from associating with them even if they perceive the overall quality
of the basketball played by these players to be inferior. We do not, however, nd an analogous
relationship between betting on the more black home teams in cities with a higher proportion of
black population. This may imply that, when taking nancial decisions directly associated with
basketball, audiences stick to the stereotypes, perhaps relying on them as informative signals.
Finally, our nding may not survive if performance criteria of the teams or the factors that
may be a¤ecting each teams performance against specic opponents are explicitly included in the
specication. As noted earlier, in our baseline, we control for time-invarying team characteristics
and team-invarying time e¤ects. But the performance and, relatedly, the morale of a team may vary
through a given season or when faced with a certain opponent, e.g., because their game strategies
are similar or because the bettors perceive a match between two specic teams di¤erently from
others. Another issue could be that bookmakers correct any systemic mistakes that may be occur
in setting the spread as the same two teams face each other again and again. Table 6d presents the
results obtained when the records and winning streaks of the teams are added to the specication
and xed e¤ects for specic team pairings are included. Our nding that the more black team has
a lower probability of beating the spread is robust to these checks.
4.5 Prot opportunities
So far, we have presented evidence that there is a negative relationship between the relative blackness
of a team and its probability of beating the spread. The question then is whether there are
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protable strategies which consistently yield returns over the break-even hurdle. We rst examine
the outcome of a simple betting strategy using data from the 2007-08 season. We employ a very
simple strategy: only bet on the home team when it has 1, 2, 3, or 4 more white players than the
visiting team. As a result of this simple betting strategy, we observe the probability of a winning
bet to be as high as 75 percent and net returns (accounting for the cost of betting) ranging from 10
percent to 43 percent. Table 7 presents the results of adopting this strategy over our whole sample
period. Indeed, this strategy of betting on the home team when it has more white players delivers
positive net returns that increase with the starkness of the racial di¤erence between the two teams.
The bets placed, on average, win 63 percent of the time for an overall average return of 19 percent.
5 Conclusion
This paper looks at the impact of the positive stereotype of the black basketball star on nancial
decisions using evidence from sports betting markets. We nd evidence of a bias in NBA betting
markets based on race. We also nd evidence that this bias is exploited by the bookmakers. This
nding can be explained by bettors taking race as a signal of skill level in deciding on which team
to bet but bookmakers, having more at stake, gathering more information on skill levels and setting
the point spreads higher for more black teams to take advantage of the bias towards them. An
interesting implication of the ndings is that stereotypes may a¤ect even well-thought nancial
decisions.
What do these ndings mean for basketball markets in general and for other economic markets?
Most straightforwardly, if the basketball betting market harbors overestimation of skill conditional
on race, does this also apply to coaches and scouts or other basketball experts? Or, do presumptions
about intellectual or athletic ability based on stereotypes increase or decrease the odds of success
for certain groups in certain elds? Another, perhaps a socially and politically uncomfortable
question which may arise from this analysis is, if people are prone to making suboptimal sports
betting decisions due to racial stereotypes, do people make similar costly judgment errors in other
economic decisions.13 For instance, do employers hire engineers with a background from a particular
region presuming that they have an innate ability for quantitative tasks? Or, is provision of health,
education, and other social services a¤ected by subconscious attitudes towards some groups? These
and other interesting questions are left for further research.
13See Wolfers (2006a) for more on this.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Forecast Errors
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Figure 2: Di¤erence between the Winning Margin and the Point Spread against Normal Distribution
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Figure 3: Accuracy of Point Spreads
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Figure 4: Distribution of Moves in the Betting Line
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Table 1a. Summary Statistics at Player-Game Level: Raw
Black players White players Signicance
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. of di¤erence
Age 323705 27.80 4.21 98200 27.56 3.85 <0.01
Height (inches) 323705 78.47 3.60 98202 80.37 3.85 >0.99
Weight (pounds) 323705 213.42 27.07 98202 224.40 27.91 >0.99
Games started 323705 0.52 0.50 98200 0.45 0.50 <0.01
Minutes played 323705 24.77 11.99 98200 22.09 11.85 <0.01
Personal fouls 323704 2.23 1.55 98200 2.16 1.57 <0.01
Points 323702 10.18 8.29 98200 8.65 7.45 <0.01
Free throws attempted 323705 2.69 3.14 98200 2.15 2.73 <0.01
Free throws made 323705 2.00 2.52 98200 1.64 2.24 <0.01
Free throw percentage 206297 0.73 0.28 55808 0.75 0.29 >0.99
Field goals attempted 323705 8.45 5.98 98200 7.04 5.22 <0.01
Field goals made 323705 3.83 3.18 98200 3.24 2.85 <0.01
Field goal percentage 308737 0.44 0.23 91852 0.44 0.25 >0.99
Two point shots attempted 323705 6.98 5.27 98200 5.61 4.59 <0.01
Two point shots made 323705 3.32 2.93 98200 2.72 2.61 <0.01
Two point shot percentage 303843 0.46 0.25 89369 0.47 0.28 >0.99
Three point shots attempted 323705 1.46 2.15 98200 1.43 2.07 <0.01
Three point shots made 323705 0.51 1.01 98200 0.53 1.01 >0.99
Three point shot percentage 155425 0.31 0.32 46555 0.34 0.33 >0.99
O¤ensive rebounds 323705 1.25 1.55 98200 1.16 1.48 <0.01
Defensive rebounds 323705 2.99 2.71 98200 2.92 2.70 <0.01
Total rebounds 323705 4.23 3.66 98200 4.09 3.58 <0.01
Assists 323705 2.27 2.58 98200 2.04 2.65 <0.01
Steals 323705 0.83 1.06 98200 0.66 0.96 <0.01
Blocks 323705 0.50 0.95 98200 0.50 0.96 0.38
Turnovers 323705 1.49 1.47 98200 1.30 1.40 <0.01
Win score 323702 4.23 5.51 98200 4.18 5.33 >0.99
Notes: The last column shows the p-values from t-tests with the null hypothesis that the statistic for
black players is greater than the statistic for white players.
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Table 1b. Summary Statistics at Player-Game Level: Adjusted
Black players White players Signicance
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. of di¤erence
Personal fouls 323178 4.99 5.07 98028 5.61 6.14 >0.99
Points 323176 18.04 12.07 98028 17.13 12.79 <0.01
Free throws attempted 323179 4.89 6.32 98028 4.38 6.69 <0.01
Free throws made 323179 3.55 4.85 98028 3.24 5.14 <0.01
Free throw percentage 206288 1.53 1.86 55807 1.76 2.33 >0.99
Field goals attempted 323179 15.61 8.07 98028 14.71 8.39 <0.01
Field goals made 323179 6.80 4.90 98028 6.44 5.16 <0.01
Field goal percentage 308710 1.15 2.27 91836 1.35 2.73 >0.99
Two point shots attempted 323179 12.94 7.62 98028 11.78 7.99 <0.01
Two point shots made 323179 5.92 4.70 98028 5.43 4.92 <0.01
Two point shot percentage 303829 1.18 2.25 89363 1.37 2.67 >0.99
Three point shots attempted 323179 2.67 4.04 98028 2.92 4.52 >0.99
Three point shots made 323179 0.88 1.89 98028 1.01 2.22 >0.99
Three point shot percentage 155412 0.64 1.39 46544 0.80 1.83 >0.99
O¤ensive rebounds 323179 2.48 3.55 98028 2.66 3.95 >0.99
Defensive rebounds 323179 5.66 4.93 98028 6.20 5.52 >0.99
Total rebounds 323179 8.15 6.52 98028 8.85 7.17 >0.99
Assists 323179 4.09 4.46 98028 3.92 4.77 <0.01
Steals 323179 1.57 2.38 98028 1.39 2.44 <0.01
Blocks 323179 0.98 2.14 98028 1.09 2.40 >0.99
Turnovers 323179 2.99 3.56 98028 2.90 3.87 <0.01
Win score 323176 6.74 11.70 98028 7.28 12.88 >0.99
Notes: The last column shows the p-values from t-tests with the null hypothesis that the statistic for
black players is greater than the statistic for white players. Adjusted statistics are calculated by multiplying
the raw statistics in Table 1a with 48 (the total number of minutes in a regular game, i.e., no overtime)
and then dividing by the actual number of minutes played by that player in that game.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics at Team-Game Level
Obs Mean St. Dev.
All
Point spread 16375 -1.79 4.90
Realized margin 17183 3.35 14.15
Realized margin - spread 16375 1.59 12.25
Probability of beating the spread 16375 0.55 0.50
Black starters 17184 3.90 1.05
Di¤erence in black starters 17183 0.01 1.41
Black players in the roster 17184 7.60 1.63
Di¤erence in black players in the roster 17183 -0.01 2.12
Black minutes 17027 0.78 0.16
Di¤erence in black minutes 16987 0.001 0.21
Home underdog
Point spread 4866 4.52 2.56
Realized margin 5675 -3.17 13.19
Realized margin - spread 4866 0.39 11.63
Probability of beating the spread 4866 0.48 0.50
Black starters 5675 3.99 0.97
Di¤erence in black starters 5675 0.20 1.41
Black players in the roster 5675 7.66 1.57
Di¤erence in black players in the roster 5675 0.16 2.11
Black minutes 5612 0.80 0.14
Di¤erence in black minutes 5608 0.03 0.21
Home favorite
Point spread 11509 -4.46 2.74
Realized margin 11508 6.57 13.49
Realized margin - spread 11509 2.10 12.47
Probability of beating the spread 11509 0.59 0.49
Black starters 11509 3.85 1.08
Di¤erence in black starters 11508 -0.08 1.41
Black players in the roster 11509 7.58 1.66
Di¤erence in black players in the roster 11508 -0.10 2.12
Black minutes 11415 0.77 0.17
Di¤erence in black minutes 11379 -0.02 0.21
Notes: Point spread is the quoted spread on a game as of closing time for bets, expressed from the
home teams perspective. Realized margin is the actual di¤erence between the home team score and the
visiting team score at the end of the game. Probability of beating the spread is a dummy that is 1 if a
bet on the home team wins. Black starters is the number of black players in the starting line-up. Black
players in the roster is the number of black players in the full team roster. Black minutes is the proportion
of minutes played by black players to the total minutes in the game, calculated over the past ve games
the team has played. These measures of blackness of a team refer to the home team. Di¤erence in black
starters is calculated as the number of black players (number of black players in the roster, proportion of
black minutes) in the home team minus the number of black players (number of black players in the roster,
proportion of black minutes) in the visiting team.
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Table 3. Winning the Game
Realized margin
Di¤erence in black starters 0.098 0.286***
[0.080] [0.105]
Di¤. in black players in the roster 0.048 0.091
[0.059] [0.066]
Di¤erence in black minutes -4.152*** -4.347***
[0.579] [0.675]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Team-season interactions no yes no yes no yes
Observations 17183 17183 17183 17183 16987 16987
R-squared 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.14
Probability of winning
Di¤erence in black starters -0.024*** -0.023***
[0.008] [0.009]
Di¤. in black players in the roster -0.021*** -0.029***
[0.005] [0.006]
Di¤erence in black minutes -0.331*** -0.399***
[0.053] [0.065]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Team-season interactions no yes no yes no yes
Observations 17183 17183 17183 17183 16987 16987
Notes: The dependent variable in the upper panel is the realized margin in the game, computed as the
home team score minus the visiting team score. The dependent variable in the lower panel is the probability
of winning, which is a dummy that is 1 if the home team won the game. The regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares for the winning margin, and using probit for the probability of winning. Di¤erence in
black starters is calculated as the number of black players (number of black players in the roster, proportion
of black minutes over the past ve games) in the home team minus the number of black players (number
of black players in the roster, proportion of black minutes over the past ve games) in the visiting team.
Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and
10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 4. Beating the Spread
Point spread
Di¤erence in black starters 0.269*** 0.341***
[0.029] [0.029]
Di¤. in black players in the roster 0.092*** 0.132***
[0.019] [0.019]
Di¤erence in black minutes 2.264*** 2.940***
[0.204] [0.211]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Team-season interactions no yes no yes no yes
Observations 16374 16374 16374 16374 16192 16192
R-squared 0.09 0.31 0.08 0.30 0.09 0.31
Realized margin - spread
Di¤erence in black starters -0.291*** -0.227***
[0.073] [0.084]
Di¤. in black players in the roster -0.211*** -0.240***
[0.048] [0.054]
Di¤erence in black minutes -1.878*** -1.441***
[0.512] [0.602]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Team-season interactions no yes no yes no yes
Observations 16374 16374 16374 16374 16192 16192
R-squared 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07
Probability of beating the spread
Di¤erence in black starters -0.023*** -0.023***
[0.008] [0.008]
Di¤. in black players in the roster -0.022*** -0.030***
[0.005] [0.006]
Di¤erence in black minutes -0.129** -0.135**
[0.053] [0.064]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Team-season interactions no yes no yes no yes
Observations 16374 16374 16374 16374 16192 16192
Notes: The dependent variable in the upper panel is the point spread quoted on the game, expressed
from the home teams perspective. The dependent variable in the middle panel is the di¤erence between
the realized margin (the actual outcome of the game) and the point spread. The dependent variable in the
lower panel is the probability of beating the spread, which is a dummy that is 1 if a bet on the home team
wins. The regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares for the point spread and the di¤erence
between the realized margin and the spread, and using probit for the probability of beating the spread.
Di¤erence in black starters is calculated as the number of black players (number of black players in the
roster, proportion of black minutes over the past ve games) in the home team minus the number of black
players (number of black players in the roster, proportion of black minutes over the past ve games) in the
visiting team. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance
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at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5a. Moving the Line
Closing line - Opening line
Di¤erence in black starters 0.014** 0.008 0.008 0.006
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009]
Team xed e¤ects no yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects no no yes yes
Team-season interactions no no no yes
Observations 7977 7977 7977 7977
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
Notes: The dependent variable is the di¤erence between the closing and opening values of the line on
the game, showing how much the point spread moves from the start of betting until all bets close. The
regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares. Di¤erence in black starters is calculated as the
number of black players in the home team minus the number of black players in the visiting team. Robust
standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5b. Bias in Bets
Money bet on home team
Di¤erence in black starters 0.185 0.243* 0.243* 0.285*
[0.118] [0.140] [0.140] [0.158]
Team xed e¤ects no yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects no no yes yes
Team-season interactions no no no yes
Observations 8011 8011 8011 8011
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable is the money placed as bets on the home team, expressed as a percentage
of the total bets placed on the game. The regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares. Di¤erence
in black starters is calculated as the number of black players in the home team minus the number of black
players in the visiting team. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical
signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 6a. Robustness: Referees
Probability of beating the spread
At least one black referee At least one white referee
Di¤erence in black starters -0.018* -0.023***
[0.010] [0.009]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes
Observations 12414 16007
All-black crew All-white crew
Di¤erence in black starters -0.092 -0.046**
[0.122] [0.020]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes
Observations 152 3876
Neither all-black nor all-white crew Referee race as additional control
Di¤erence in black starters -0.019* -0.021**
[0.010] [0.009]
Proportion of white referees -0.141***
[0.043]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes
Observations 12027 16281
Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. Di¤erence in black starters is calculated as the
number of black players in the home team minus the number of black players in the visiting team. The race
composition of referees are taken into account by splitting the sample by the proportion of black referees in
the 3-person crew. Alternatively, the proportion of white referees is included as a control variable. Robust
standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels, respectively.
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Table 6b. Robustness: Coaches
Probability of beating the spread
Black (H), white (V) White (H), black (V)
Di¤erence in black starters -0.018 0.051**
[0.019] [0.024]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes
Observations 3201 3142
Both black or both white Coach race as additional control
Di¤erence in black starters -0.037*** -0.017*
[0.012] [0.009]
Di¤erence in coachesrace -0.092***
[0.022]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes
Observations 9864 16374
Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. Di¤erence in black starters is calculated as the
number of black players in the home team minus the number of black players in the visiting team. The
race of the coach is taken into account by splitting the sample by the races of both the home and visiting
teams coaches. Alternatively, the proportion of white referees is included as a control variable. In the
rst column, "Black (H), white (V)" indicates that only observations where the coach of the team is black
and the coach of the visiting team is white are included. In the second column, "White (H), black (V)"
indicates that only observations where the coach of the team is white and the coach of the visiting team is
black are included. In the third column, either both coaches are black or both coaches are white. In the
last column, di¤erence in coachesrace is calculated by rst creating a dummy for the coach of each team
(1 if the coach is black) and then subtracting the visiting teams dummy from the home teams. Robust
standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels, respectively.
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Table 6c. Robustness: Population in Host Location
Probability of beating the spread
Di¤erence in black starters -0.022** -0.021**
[0.009] [0.009]
Di¤. in proportion of blacks in the city -0.0001
[0.0001]
Di¤. in proportion of blacks in the state -0.001
[0.001]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes
Observations 16293 16293
Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. Di¤erence in black starters is calculated as the number
of black players in the home team minus the number of black players in the visiting team. The di¤erence
in proportion of blacks in the city (state) is computed by subtracting the percent of black population, as of
2000, in the visiting teams host city (state) from the percent of black population in the home teams host
city (state). Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at
the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 6d. Robustness: History of Teams
Probability of beating the spread
Di¤erence in black starters -0.021** -0.023** -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.009**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.004]
Di¤erence in records 0.033***
[0.007]
Di¤erence in streaks 0.092***
[0.032]
Margin on the teamslast match 0.003***
[0.001]
Spread on the teamslast match 0.0002
[0.003]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes yes yes yes
Match xed e¤ects no no no no yes
Observations 16370 16192 15470 14814 16374
Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. Di¤erence in black starters is calculated as the
number of black players in the home team minus the number of black players in the visiting team. In
the rst column, the di¤erence in records is calculated as the di¤erence between the number of wins the
home team had in a particular season until the game in consideration and the number of wins the visiting
team had in the same season. In the second column, the di¤erence in streaks is calculated as the di¤erence
between the number of wins the home team had in a particular season over the ve previous games before
the game in consideration and the number of wins the visiting team had over the ve previous games. In the
third column, the margin on the teamslast match is computed as the di¤erence between home teams score
and the visiting teams score obtained the last time the two teams played against each other (irrespective of
the location). In the fourth column, the spread on the teamslast match is the point spread quoted on the
last game the two teams faced each other (irrespective of the location and expressed from the home teams
perspective). Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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